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11. Difficulties surrounding the question, but why it nevertheless does arise
In this paper I take up the challenge of discussing progress in normative economics. The
difficulties surrounding the enterprise are obvious. First of all, it is notoriously hard to
say what exactly normative economics is about - welfare or choice, value judgments or
the study of value judgements, economic policy or armchair evaluation. Economic
methodologists or theorists have provided grand statements on how normative
economics should be separated from positive economics and applied economics; see
Keynes (1890), Robbins (1932), Samuelson (1947), Little (1950), Archibald (1959), to
name but a few. However, these accounts are hardly compatible with each other, and it
is not always clear how they relate to the work actually done in economics. The paper
will adopt the following noncommittal view: the task of normative economics is to
investigate methods and criteria for evaluating the relative desirability of economic states
of affairs. This is a noncommittal statement because it does not say whether normative
economics itself endorses the evaluations (and thus makes  value judgments) or just
explores the way of making them (and thus only relates to value judgments).
Furthermore, it does not decide either whether a more desirable state is one involving
more welfare, or more preference satisfaction, or more choice, or more of anything else.
However, despite its utter generality, the definition is not vacuous. In particular, it
makes it clear that normative economics has a teleological rather than a deontological
structure, to use the familiar ethical distinction. That is to say, normative economics
draws conclusions about the rightness of actions (here, policy arrangements) from a
prior investigation of the desirability or "goodness" of economic states of affairs. The
definition also encapsulates the claim that normative economics is primarily concerned
with evaluations, and only secondarily with recommendations or prescriptions. It
allows the economist to assess the functioning of markets without requiring that his
evaluations be translated into specific policies. This is a view that I am going to take for
granted here, although I realize that some might disagree with it.1
A second difficulty is that philosophers do not provide obvious guidance for the
question I am tackling. They have nearly exclusively discussed progress in relation to
science, while rarely contemplating the possibility that there is such a thing as
normative science.2 A further difficulty is that most of the available work on scientific
progress deals with the empirical sciences; very little has been written on progress in
logic and mathematics. Admittedly, even a suitable notion of conceptual progress for
                                    
1 More on the abstract issues of this paragraph in Mongin (2004).
2 There is nonetheless a continental tradition of considering ethics as a normative science; see Kalinowki
(1969) who traces it back to the Leipzig philosopher Wundt at the end of the 19th century. However, this
tradition is hardly known outside France and Germany, and did not have much influence even there.
2empirical sciences like physics or biology could prove valuable for my purpose.
Unfortunately, philosophy of science does not have much to say about the more
theoretical side of progress in the empirical sciences.3
Despite these bleak prospects, the question of progress in normative economics is a
natural and even urgent one to investigate. The field exhibits a relatively simple pattern
of development, and to the specialist at least, this pattern is both intelligible and
oriented. Quite a few economists even believe that it is a progressive  pattern -  although
they would find it uneasy to explain what they mean by that. I am interested in making
sense of this intriguing view and assessing it. I offer this as an excuse for embarking on
an adventurous paper.
2. The historical pattern of normative economics
The historical pattern is easy to discern. The "economics of welfare", as Pigou (1920)
called it, reformulated and extended the patchy analyses of the social benefits of well-
functioning markets that could be found in Marshall and other early Neo-Classicals.
Pigou’s work is not only more focused than his predecessors’, but also much closer to
the abstract definition of normative economics given above. Typically, it is clearer in
distinguishing between the principles for evaluating economic states of affairs and the
way these states of affairs come about in the market with or without State intervention
(it is another contribution of Pigou that he identifies the corrective rôle of the State more
precisely than his predecessors). However, when it comes to explicating his desirability
concept, i.e., economic welfare, Pigou leaves the reader with insufficient guidance. In a
related criticism, Arrow (1983, p. 18) noted that he had optimality conditions in mind
but never properly explained what his maximand was. Whatever the exact meaning of his
optimality conditions, he intended them to bear not only on the efficacy of the
economy, but also on the distribution of income. Hence the easy and common
reconstruction of Pigou's Economics of Welfare as being utilitarian, a reconstruction
which I believe requires further scrutiny.4 This old-style welfare economics is the first
form of normative economics. I will leave it aside for the rest of the paper.
The so-called new welfare economics, which crystallized in the 1930s and developed up
to the 1950s, corresponds to the second historical form. It was much clearer than the
                                    
3 This was emphasized by Laudan (1977, ch. 2), whose attempt to go beyond this negative diagnosis
was meritorious but sketchy. Kitcher (1993, ch. 3) has further pursued the issue of conceptual progress in
the empirical sciences.
4 Myint's (1942) history of early welfare theories may be the last systematic account of The Economics
of Welfare. The book cries out for a modern appraisal.
3older welfare economics about its premisses - prominent among which was what we
now call the Pareto Principle5 -, and it eventually reached a conceptually clear
separation between the optimality conditions themselves and their application to
markets and economic policies. The main results obtained in these years were the
fundamental theorems of welfare economics (I am using the modern terminology again
for simplicity). The first fundamental theorem states that under mild conditions, a
competitive equilibrium satisfies the conditions for a Pareto optimum. The second
fundamental theorem says that under more stringent conditions, any Pareto optimum
can be obtained as a competitive equilibrium after the agents' initial endowments have
been modified by suitable lump-sum transfers.6 Using different conceptual and technical
means, the new welfare economics was pursuing a slimmer version of Pigou's
programme. Officially, it avoided the evaluation of income distribution, reserving it for
the politician, the moralist, or the "economist qua citizen". The so-called Compensation
Principle was an attempt to extend the optimality concept beyond the limits of the
Pareto Principle while eschewing detailed distributive comparisons of the type
exemplified by utilitarianism. The proponents of the principle believed that it was
assertive enough to permit an evaluation of, say, the repeal of Corn Laws, although this
measure had upset the income distribution between farmers, landowners, and wage-
earners. 
The third historical stage corresponds roughly to two different forms of normative
economics, i.e., social choice theory on the one hand, and public economics on the other.
It is often said that Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values  in 1951 struck a fatal
blow to the new welfare economics. However, this claim cannot be interpreted as saying
that social choice theory superseded welfare economics in its traditional role of assessing
the working of markets and proposing improvements in terms of corrective taxes and the
like. The objective of social choice theory set down by Arrow and further clarified by
Sen's Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1970) is to investigate the various abstract
methods of evaluating social states. Applications may or may not be market-related and
enter the theory mostly by way of examples. From the 1970s onwards, it has been
incumbent on the newly created discipline of public economics to discuss market
optimality and policy corrections when the markets fail. Public economics has come to
absorb most of the applied content of the "new welfare economics" that has survived
criticism, so that there are currently two, quite distinct forms of normative economics
being practiced in parallel. There may even be more than two if one takes into account
                                    
5 "Individualism" in the older terminology of Bergson and Samuelson. Little (1950) is usually credited
for the modern expression.
6 Beginners sometimes believe that the two theorems taken together form an equivalence statement. This
is not the case.  
4inequality theory and poverty theory, which have developed in a relatively autonomous
way for the last twenty years or so. Just by itself, this division process is enough to
make the transition from the second to the third stage a complicated affair.
There is some evidence that normative economics might be undergoing another change.
The bulk of social choice theory up to the mid-80s, and the whole of public economics
roughly up to now, are welfarist. That is to say, they take the information provided by
the individuals' utility functions to be necessary and sufficient data for the social
evaluation or the public decision.7 This was the element of continuity between the third
stage and the first two, as it were. From the point of view of social ethics, welfarism is a
restrictive, and indeed conceptually problematic, principle to adopt. Internal criticism,
especially in Sen's later work, as well as the recent dialogue between political
philosophers and economists, have helped to bring this point home. Accordingly, some
economists have started to reorient social choice theory in a non-welfarist direction.
Sometimes they dispense altogether with utility functions, as they do when analyzing
rights. More commonly, they supplement utility information with other sources, as
when discussing talents and handicaps, opportunities and "capabilities". This theorizing
is covered by fashionable labels such as "economic theories of justice" or "equity",
which suggest a philosophical potential that welfare economics never claimed for itself,
but there are also hints of implications and even applications, in the economist's
specialized sense. So arguably, normative economics is undergoing another
metamorphosis. I hasten to add that not everybody in the field - even among those who
contribute to reshape it - would agree with the present suggestion. Some "equity"
theories are still welfarist in the very sense of this paragraph,8 and it is a fact that public
economists are slow to catch up with the new developments. This said, nobody would
deny that normative economics is on the move again and that welfarism is one of the
major issues currently under discussion.    
We may now be at the right historical distance to decide whether the third stage can be
considered a progressive one. The present paper sets itself the more limited task of
deciding whether social choice theory was progressive compared with the new welfare
economics. Given the dissimilarities in scope I mentioned, the question can only relate
to the theoretical outlook of the new welfare economics. A fuller assessment would have
to include public economics, but I refrained from taking it into account here because of
the complex preliminaries this would involve. While social choice theory emerged  all of
                                    
7 Here I follow Sen's usual definition of "welfarism", which goes in terms of utility functions. An
alternative definition will be employed in section 7.
8 Two examples are the "non-envy" and "egalitarian-equivalent" constructions; see Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (1999) for a survey.
5a sudden in Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values in 1951, there is no
pathbreaking work to signal the birth of public economics. It established itself as a field
unobstrusively around 1970 by absorbing parts not only of welfare economics, but also
of public finance, an ill-defined field which belonged more to positive than normative
economics. At the time, both welfare economics and public finance had fallen into
relative disrepute. Public economics combined whatever seemed worth taking in their
legacy with scattered contributions such as Samuelson's analysis of public goods,
Lipsey and Lancaster's work on "second-best" evaluation, Diamond and Mirrlees's
theory of optimal taxation. To make things even more complicated, public economics
did not fully endorse the separation of welfare economics into old and new - while
critical of both, it also borrowed something from each, and in particular sometimes
revived a utilitarian style of evaluation. Although there exist valuable retrospectives,9 I
do not know of any authoritative summing up of these many connections. In contrast,
there is a received view, which was established by Arrow and approved by his
followers, of the connection between social choice theory and the new welfare
economics. These writers claimed - and convinced the average economist to believe - that
the new welfare economics was based on a hidden internal contradiction. Among other
astonishing implications, Arrow's theorem would lay bare the logical impossibility of a
well-behaved Paretian social welfare function. The theorem would also point out the
way of escape, which would consist in letting interpersonal comparisons of utility - be
they utilitarian or of other kind - enter the social welfare function. This standard
argument grounds the widespread idea that social choice theory superseded the new
welfare economics.10 This is an explicit claim of progress, which explains why I have
centred the paper around it. Once it is clarified, I will compare it with the abstractly
devised criterion of progress that is mooted in next section. The major finding will be
that the standard argument is ill-conceived but that the transition to social choice theory
was progressive nonetheless, according to the criterion. It is as if the social choice
theorists had seen the right move in the game, while giving for it a wrong reason.
3. A provisional definition of progress
I start by contrasting intertheoretic with intratheoretic progress. It is perhaps not too
difficult to recognize advances made within the confines of a given theory when it is
neatly structured - and this is the case of both social choice theory and the new welfare
                                    
9 See in particular Hammond (1990) and Drèze (1995) .
10 Few works with the title "welfare economics" were published beyond the 1960's. The strongest ones,
which are Feldman's (1980) and Boadway and Bruce's (1984), mostly consist of an admixture of social
choice theory with public economics. The others, like de Graaff's (1957) and Mishan's (1969), or the later
editions of Little (1950), are outdated restatements of pre-Arrovian welfare economics.
6economics in its more abstract parts. There is a story of successive clarifications of the
two fundamental welfare theorems, and a story of successive refinements of Arrow's
impossibility theorem. Both exemplify a form of progress in normative economics, but
this is not the form I am interested in diagnosing, unless it interferes with the other form.
Intertheoretic progress is what this paper is about.
When it comes to intertheoretic progress, controversy bursts out, and we can hardly do
without an explicit definition. Making a bold attempt, I will say that a shift from a
theory T to a theory T' is progressive if: (1) T' provides a solution to at least one
unresolved problem of T; (2) T' provides a solution to the main problems that T had
already addressed and resolved in its own way; (3) T' raises new problems and manages
to solve at least one of them; (4) T does not satisfy the previous conditions with respect
to T'.
This definition embodies the four ideas of (1) constructive criticism, (2) theoretical
continuity, (3) independence, and (4) asymmetry, which are arguably the component
parts of the common-sense notion of progress. Notice that if we take T and T' to refer
to distinct variants of the same theory, we get a working definition of intratheoretic
progress as a particular case. Importantly, the definition does not make particular
reference to normative theories. The concept of problem-solving is broad - and vague -
enough to apply to them as well as to theories in the empirical sciences and in
mathematics. If one construes "problems" as either predictions to be confirmed or facts
to be explained, one gets a definition similar to that of a progressive shift in Lakatos
(1970). 
Actually, something can be learned from the earlier debates surrounding Lakatos's
methodology and Popper's (1963, ch. 10) related conception, which inspired it. This
analogy suggests that there are two possibilities to consider for (1). Either the
"unresolved problem" is already recognized by T and is very much like an anomaly
accompanying T. Or it is not only solved but also pointed out by T', in which case it is
like a novel fact . We might expect both kinds of situations to occur with normative
theories. It is arguable that standard ethical rules, such as utilitarianism, are accompanied
with anomalies.11 In normative economics, the many difficulties surrounding the
Compensation Principle were treated, at least initially, like anomalies. The case of
Arrow's theorem, on which I will elaborate, illustrates the opposite model - that of a
novel fact.
                                    
11 Consider for instance the discussion (and eventual dismissal) of fanaticism in Hare's (1976) utilitarian
theory. The notion of anomaly is by no means limited to the empirical sciences. Mathematical theories
can be accompanied with anomalies, as Lakatos's (1963-64) classic polyhedron example shows.
7Something we learned from the discussions on research programmes is that it is most
delicate to construe theoretical continuity appropriately. Instead of (2), I might have
required that T' solve all the significant problems already solved by T. This would be
asking too much, just as Popper's and Lakatos's famous requirement of non-decreasing
content has proved to be too exacting. To say that just one of the earlier problems needs
to be solved would be too lax. Accordingly, I remain vague in my clause (2) even if this
is not very satisfactory. As for clause (3), it plays the same rôle as the requirement of
added content in Popper and Lakatos, that is to say, it serves to exclude ad hoc
modifications of T. Lakatos insisted that at least one of the independent predictions
should be borne out by the facts, but Popper generally did not make this requirement.12
My suggestion for (3) parallels Lakatos's condition, and is presumably open to the
charge of disguised inductivism that was levelled against it by some Popperians.13
Here is where the analogy breaks down. The classic requirements of increasing testable
content in Lakatos and Popper imply that there are logical relations between successive
theories. On the simplest construal, T and T' will share a subset of their logical
consequences. Once allowance is made for the fact that theories need auxiliary
statements in order to deliver predictions, this straightforward conclusion need not hold
anymore. But it is still the case that T and T' will be logically related, although in terms
of other statements and in a possibly non-transparent way. Nothing of the sort is
implied by the above definition; in fact, T and T' might respond to the same problems
using entirely different means. For instance, it can happen that the problems that T was
resolving actively are shown not to arise in T'. I would regard this as an instantiation of
clause (2). Generally, when the notion of a successful prediction gives way to that of
successful problem-solving, much - perhaps too much - flexibility is introduced. The
theories in a sequence declared to be progressive according to (1), (2) and (3) may be
related to each other in a number of ways. This is why I need (4) in order to include the
commonsensical feature of asymmetry into my working definition of progress. The
methodology of research programmes makes this clause redundant because of the logical
relations already established by the analogues of (1), (2), and (3).
4. The social-choice-theoretic critique of welfare economics: historical
landmarks
                                    
12 But see the requirement of empirical success in Popper (1963, p. 242-244).
13 The issue of inductivism in the non-empirical sciences is touched on by Howson (1979), who also
makes suggestions on how to apply the methodology of research programmes to non-empirical
disciplines like mathematics.
84.1.The general optimum and Bergson's welfare function
The new welfare economics isolated and placed considerable emphasis on the problem
of determining the conditions for "the general optimum", which it described as being a
point of maximum social welfare. In essence, this was the problem of simultaneous
maximizing the members of society's utility functions, given the interdependencies
prevailing between producers and consumers and the constraints imposed on their
available initial resources. The problem was resolved while assuming nothing about the
cardinal measurability and interpersonal comparability of utility - that is, in
contemporary language, by invoking only the Pareto Principle. For the present
purposes, I will restrict attention to late restatements of this solution by Bergson
(1938), Samuelson, whose Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947) expands on
Bergson's work, and Lange (1942), who takes a different approach. These three pieces
exemplify the new welfare economics at its best and are thus suitable for a discussion of
progress.
Bergson takes the step of discussing the general optimum conditions in terms "the
Economic Welfare Function" (1938, p. 312), which takes as arguments the
consumptions of commodities and expenses of factors (e.g., labour) of all the
individuals. Symbolically, i = 1,...,n will denote the individuals, xi  the vectors of
quantities consumed or expended by each i, x = (x1,...,xn) the allocation vector of the
economy, and E = E(x1,...,xn)= E(x) will represent Bergson's function. He makes the
standard economic assumptions that E  is increasing in individual consumptions and
decreasing in individual expenses, and, at some point, that it satisfies the Pareto
Principle, which he calls the Fundamental Value Propositions of Individual Preference
(1938, p. 318). Given the Pareto Indifference condition, E  factors out in terms of the
individual utility functions Ui , i.e., there exists another function W  that is defined on
vectors of utility values and satisfies the equation: E(x) = W(U1(x),...,Un(x)) for all x.
Adding the Strict Pareto condition, which makes the other half of the Pareto Principle,
one concludes that W  is increasing in each of its arguments. Bergson's contribution was
to show that this thin set of assumptions was sufficient to obtain the already known
conditions for the general optimum, i.e., that the marginal rates of substitution between
commodities are equal from one individual to another, and similarly for the other
relevant marginal substitution and transformation rates.
As Bergson also explains, more special conditions that appeared in the past could be
traced back to supplementary assumptions imposed on W . For example, some of the
marginal statements considered by "the Cambridge economists" - Pigou and his
followers - depended on assuming the additive form U1(x)+ ...+Un(x). For both the
9generic W  and its specialized variants, Bergson derived marginal statements as the first-
order conditions of a constrained maximization programme in which either W  or its
variants stood for the objective, and the technical possibilities set the constraints.14 In
the Foundations (1947, p. 229-253) Samuelson follows the same method of approaching
the general optimum in terms of maximizing an objective function; hence the expression
commonly used in the post-war years for the Paretian-inclusive W , "the Bergson-
Samuelson social welfare function". At the early stage, neither author was clear about
the extent to which W  made interpersonal comparisons between the Ui . They knew
that the Cambridge function did, since it is but a variant of utilitarianism, but it
transpires from both the 1938 paper and the Foundations that they had not sorted out
the case for the social welfare function in general.
This is an important claim for the discussion to come, and a possibly contentious one,
so I will provide some textual evidence. Bergson remains cryptic throughout his paper
about interpersonal comparisons of utility. He blurs the specific issue they raise by
claiming that "value judgments" permeate all and every assumption underlying the
Economic Welfare Function E  (including the seemingly unproblematic Paretian
conditions). The only place where he explicitly connects a "value proposition" with
interpersonal comparisons is the passage on the Cambridge function (1938, p. 327).
This obvious case does not help one to decide how he construes W  more generally.
However, once and almost inadvertently, he defines W  in a way that precludes
interpersonal comparisons of utility - he explains that the Ui  can represent indifference
loci (1938, p. 319). Samuelson is more informative than Bergson about the critical issue
of interpersonal utility comparisons. He generally writes as if W  did not make any. For
instance, in a passage I will return to later, he claims that
"if we were to change from (the) set of cardinal indexes of individual utility U1,...,Un to
another set U'1,...,U'n, we should simply change the form of the W  function so as to
leave all social decisions invariant" (1947, p. 228, notation adapted).
To paraphrase, when  (U1,...,Un)  is replaced by the cardinally different, but ordinally
equivalent utility profile (U'1,...,U'n ),W  will be changed into W'  so as to leave the
social preference unchanged. This is an exact rendering of Bergson's claim that social
welfare depends on indifference loci alone (and accordingly does not involve any
interpersonal utility comparisons). However, Samuelson appears to retract this
statement later, when he summarizes thus the case for social welfare functions:
                                    
14 In keeping with the mathematical style of his time, Bergson used only intuitive arguments to
conclude that his second-order conditions were satisfied, and relying as he did on the differential calculus,
he had no way to handle corner solutions.
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"Without a well-defined W  function, i.e., without assumptions concerning interpersonal
comparisons of utility, it is impossible to decide which of the [ Pareto optima ]  is best"
(1947, p. 244, my emphasis).15
As in Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005), where this interpretation is presented in more
detail, I conclude that Bergson's and Samuelson's early writings sorted out at best one of
the two claims involved, i.e., that W  did not logically need to make any interpersonal
comparisons of utility. At that stage, the two economists had not decided whether or
not W  should normatively make such comparisons.
Another landmark of the new welfare economics, Lange's (1942) paper has in common
with Bergson's and Samuelson's work that it explores the logical possibilities of the
Pareto principle. Its second part contains a discussion of the general optimum that
follows and actually improves on Bergson's, but the first part stands in sharp contrast
with the latter's method of analysis. There, Lange introduced the (by now well-known)
method of computing Pareto optima by maximizing one individual's utility function
given that the technical possibilities are fixed and that the other individuals' utility
functions are set at predetermined values. Thus, Lange also used the apparatus of
constrained maximization, but differently from the other new welfare economists. The
lasting importance of his method is that it does not require one to introduce a social
welfare function in order to reach the marginal conditions for the general optimum.
4.2 Arrow's theorem and the new welfare economics 
Arrow's theorem has an immediate connection with Bergson's version of welfare
economics, not with Lange's. It is no coincidence that the latter is mentioned only in
passing in Social Choice and Individual Values, while the book makes the former the
target of a lengthy and elaborate argument. Remarkably, after pointing out the wide
generality of his notion of "social choice" in chapter I, Arrow chooses in chapter III to
specialize it to welfare economics. This chapter introduces the conditions leading to the
famous impossibility theorem not abstractly, but in terms of a "social welfare function",
which he claims to share important features with Bergson's own function. The 1951
conditions are Universal Domain, Positive Association, Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives, Non-Imposition, Non-Dictatorship, and Arrow's definition of a social
welfare function requires that this mapping deliver an ordering - I will call this implicit
condition Social Ordering. For simplicity, I will use the following, slightly different set
of five conditions: Universal Domain, Weak Pareto, Independence of Irrelevant
                                    
15 My reading of this sentence hinges on "well-defined", which suggests that interpersonal comparisons
of utility are part of the definition of a "Bergson-Samuelson welfare function".
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Alternatives, Non-Dictatorship, Social Ordering. This list emerged from the 1963
revision and has since become standard. For a technical wording of each condition and
proof that they are incompatible, the reader is referred to Sen's (1970) authoritative
treatment.
The discussion of Bergson continues throughout Arrow's book, recurring in chapter IV
on the Compensation Principle, and eventually culminating in chapter VI. At this
juncture, Arrow goes beyond his initial claim that Bergson's function is analogous to
one of his social welfare functions. He contends that it is in effect one of them, with the
striking consequence that it falls prey to the impossibility theorem:
"Mathematically, the Bergson social welfare function has ... the same form as the social
welfare function we have already discussed ... Hence, the Possibility Theorem ... is
applicable here; we cannot construct a Bergson social welfare function ... that will
satisfy Conditions 2-5 and that will lead to a true social ordering for every set of
individual tastes" (1963, p. 72). 
This is a crucial statement to understand the connections, both historical and logical,
between the new welfare economics and social choice theory.
On a few occasions in Social Choice and Individual Values, Arrow goes beyond the
stage of rejecting Bergson's particular version of the new welfare economics. He suggests
that his refutation makes the search for optimum conditions generally meaningless:
"We may ... doubt that any study of maximal alternatives will actually be useful in
studying those aspects of social choice which are directly related to consumer's (and
worker's) choice" (1963, p. 37).16
But there cannot be such a straightforward implication from the initial argument to this
bold suggestion. I have stressed that Lange's derivation of the marginal conditions does
not depend on using social welfare functions, which makes it immune to Arrow's
attempted refutation. One interpretation of Arrow's quote is that he viewed the study of
the general optimum as being only a  preliminary stage  in the construction of a social
welfare function. In itself, this view would be hard to defend. Clearly, the marginal
conditions have an interest by themselves, even if they do not inform us about the more
difficult cases calling for distributional considerations. There is a further reason to doubt
that Arrow seriously entertained the strong conclusion suggested by the quote - it would
imply that the important work he did to improve on the two welfare theorems was
pointless.17 Having cleared up a possible misunderstanding, I return to the real object of
Arrow's critique, which is the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function.
                                    
16 The same idea occurs in Arrow (1963, p. 63-64), where, however, it is significantly qualified.
17 Arrow's major contributions to Paretian welfare theory take place roughly at the time of Social Choice
and Individual Values. See his Collected Papers, vol. 2, especially ch.2.
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5. The social-choice-theoretic critique of welfare economics: developments and
controversies
5.1. Arrow's argument against Bergson
Arrow's rejection of Bergsonian welfare economics depends on establishing that the
Bergson-Samuelson function W  is not only related to, but identical with, a social
welfare function in his sense. This conclusion requires three steps, the first and the
second of which appear to be unproblematic. The first step is purely semantic. Arrow's
own function comes with a privileged interpretation of the individual preference
relations it depends on - they are meant to represent the individuals' evaluations of
social states, as influenced by their "values" (1963, p. 22). Bergson, and welfare
economists generally, analyze social states in terms of individual consumptions and
supplies of factors, and their notion of a utility function is meant to reflect the
individual's ordinary, unelaborate preferences -  his "tastes" as opposed to his "values"
in Arrow's terminology (p. 23). As the book points out, this semantics can be
accommodated by the social welfare function viewed as a purely formal object. Where
an objection could arise, however, is with the Universal Domain condition. If "tastes"
are construed according to standard microeconomics, i.e., as the individual's preferences
varying positively with his consumption and negatively with his expenses, and
depending on nothing else, a heavy restriction follows on the set of available preference
profiles. Hence a second, purely logical step, which consists in showing that the
impossibility theorem still holds despite the restriction ("Possibility Theorem for
Individualistic Assumptions", 1963, p. 63).18 In the sequel I will refer to the new
domain condition as Modified Universal Domain.
The ground is now cleared for the third and most problematic step, which is to defend
the other conditions in terms of the general objective and privileged interpretations of
Bergsonian welfare economics. Arrow (1963, p. 73) is disappointingly brief when it
comes to this step. Essentially, he contents himself with reminding the reader of the
general normative plausibility of the conditions - he had already defended them when
introducing them formally. This appears to be an ineffective argumentative move. Given
the task that Arrow had set for himself, he should have combined the logical use of his
theorem with a specific ad hominem argument, to the effect that Bergson had implicitly
accepted Non-Dictatorship and - above all - Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
                                    
18 This variant result justifies the earlier cryptic comment in the book that "the current analysis of
maximal social states is applicable precisely when it cannot serve the function of a preliminary to a
complete enumeration of the social ordering" (1963, p. 37).
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There are of course no questions with Social Ordering and Weak Pareto since they are
contained in Bergson's statement of the W  function.
Not surprisingly, the welfare economists plunged into the breach. Little (1952), Bergson
(1954), and Samuelson (1967), conceded that the theorem was perhaps applicable to
politics, although they would not feel entirely secure about this, but claimed most
strongly that it fell outside their field. "We must conclude that Arrow's work has no
relevance to the traditional theory of welfare economics, which culminates in the
Bergson-Samuelson formulation", said Little (1952, p. 141).19 "I agree with Little in
barring Arrow's theorem from welfare economics", added Bergson (1954, p. 247).20 "I
export Arrow from economics to politics because I do not believe that he has proved the
impossibility of the traditional Bergson welfare function of economics", wrote
Samuelson in the most famous paper of this series, "Arrow's Mathematical Politics"
(1967, p. 42).21 Later texts in welfare economics have often taken for granted the
political interpretation of the impossibility theorem, as if it provided a satisfactory
compromise between Arrow and his opponents. The usual approach goes as follows.
The politically interpreted social welfare function decides which of the many Pareto
optima should prevail; then, in accordance with the second welfare theorem, society
entrusts the market with the task of implementing the selected optimum. In the end, the
social choice of a Pareto optimum is constrained by Arrow's strictures, but this is due to
the intervening electoral stage, and not to a possible failure of Paretian economics.22
This approach concedes only indirect economic relevance to the impossibility theorem.
It takes for granted the arguments promoted by Little, Bergson and Samuelson to
downplay the direct applicability of the theorem to social welfare functions as these
economists conceived of them. I will review these arguments now.
5.2. The profile argument and the controversy of the 1970s
The first objection, which Little (1952) and Samuelson (1967) especially emphasized,
was that the very notion of an Arrow function, as defined on a set of many preference
profiles, made no sense in welfare economics; and similarly for the conditions put on
this function that involve considering several profiles at a time. Indeed, Little and
Samuelson argued that welfare economics was restricted to given individual tastes,
                                    
19 Baumol's early review of Social Choice and Individual Values  had already set the pace: "This result is
less disastrous for welfare theory than might first appear" (1952, p. 110).
20 Bergson's late restatements (1966 and 1976) uphold the same strong conclusion.
21 Revisiting the Arrow-Bergson controversy, as well as his own controversy with social choice
theorists, Samuelson (1981, 1987) came up with essentially the same claim.
22 Feldman's (1980) text illustrates this double-sided approach very clearly.
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which meant, in Arrow's framework, a unique preference profile. According to the
argument, welfare economics comparisons bear only on changes in either the physical
variables, such as individual consumptions, or the technological parameters, such as the
firms' production possibilities. This can be recast mathematically as follows: the
relevant social welfare function is a composed function and not a functional. The
standard notation W(U1,...,Un)  equivocates between the two senses because it could
mean either:
(U1,...,Un) ® W(U1,...,Un)
or:
(x1,...,xn) ® (U1(x1),...,Un(xn)) ® W(U1(x1),...,Un(xn)).
It is the latter mapping which welfare economists have in mind, and they have no use for
the former.
As it turned out from later discussions, the profile argument was not powerful enough
to save welfare economics from Arrow's onslaught. To define a "social welfare function"
on a set of many preference profiles would be immaterial if the conditions imposed on
the function did not entail comparisons between several profiles. Sen (1977, in 1982, p.
251-256) was the first to make this observation, which reduces the scope of the
disagreement to the conditions themselves, and specifically to the subclass of those
which are involved in the making of interprofile comparisons. The 1951 version had one
too many of those problematic conditions - Positive Association, which gave way to the
more familiar Weak Pareto in the 1963 version and ensuing texts.23 What remains
objectionable is the pair of conditions Universal Domain, in either its initial or adapted
form, and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. The former provides the stock of
profiles between which the latter allows one to make interprofile comparisons.24 But
crucially, the work done by social-choice theorists in the 1970s established that both
conditions could be replaced by new ones stated for a single profile, leading to the
reappearance of the impossibility theorem in this less controversial framework.25 I will
denote the single profile analogues of Modified Universal Domain, Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives, and Non-Dictatorship, by Single Profile Modified Domain,
Single Profile Neutrality, and Single Profile Non-Dictatorship, respectively. Social
Ordering and Weak Pareto do not need replacing because they are formulated identically
for either one profile or many at a time. Around 1976-1980 the three novel conditions
displaced Arrow's initial ones as the focus of attention, and a fierce controversy took
                                    
23 Thus, Little's (1952, p. 141) attacks on Positive Association proved to be ultimately vain.
24 In contrast, Non-Dictatorship eschews the profile criticism. Dictatorship is defined across profiles,
hence questionable, but just for that reason, Non-Dictatorship is relatively weak and acceptable.
25 Kemp and Ng (1976) and Parks (1976) were the first to prove this result. Sen (1977), Pollak (1979),
Roberts (1980) developed it further.
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place between those social choice theorists who had promoted them and Samuelson,
who acted as the only spokesman for the welfare economics camp.26 Fleurbaey and
Mongin (2005) have reappraised the controversy in full detail, and I will now report on
some salient conclusions from this study.
The first variant condition, Single Profile Modified Domain, decomposes into the
assumption of a rich domain of physical quantities and that of a given preference profile
of individual preference that satisfies the standard economic assumptions. Its purpose
was to create a common ground between the opposite camps. The third condition, Single
Profile Non-Dictatorship, was more contentious. Commonsensically, dictatorship
relative to a given profile is less unpalatable than it would be on a set of many profiles.
However, after brief skyrmishes around this issue,27 the welfare economists conceded
Single Profile Non-Dictatorship. The controversy focused almost exclusively on Single
Profile Neutrality, whose technical rôle in the new framework corresponds to that
assigned to Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in the original one. This condition
stipulates that if x and y are located on the individuals' preference maps exactly as are
two other states w and z, then x and y may be replaced by w and z in the social
preference, i.e., society ranks the first pair exactly as it does the second. Even for just one
profile, this is a formidable assumption to make, as Samuelson was quick to point out.
Take an "ethical observer" (Samuelson's personification of social preference) who must
allocate 100 chocolates between two individuals:
"What is the meaning of [Single Profile Neutrality] in this context? It says, "If it is
ethically better to take something (say 1 chocolate or, alternatively, say 50 chocolates)
from Person 1 who had all the chocolates in order to give to Person 2 who had none,
then it must be ethically preferable to give all the chocolates to Person 2''. One need not
be a doctrinaire egalitarian to be speechless at this requirement. Is it "reasonable'' to put
on an ethical system such a straightjacket? Few will agree that it is'' (1977, p. 83).
To connect Samuelson's example with the abstract condition, denote by x and y the
allocation vectors (100, 0) and (99, 1), where the components refer to numbers of
chocolates consumed by 1 and 2, in that order. Society has the same preferences
between x and y as between z=x= (100, 0) and w=(0,100), hence if it prefers (99, 1) to
(100, 0), it must also prefer (0, 100) to (100,0). Evidently, this conclusion defeats the
egalitarian intent of the initial preference statement. No more than this little example is
sufficient to deprive Single Profile Neutrality from its normative appeal as far as
distributive issues are concerned, i.e., for welfare economics. Although this would have
                                    
26 It is surprising that Bergson and Little remained silent on such an important occasion The welfare
economists could also rely on the support of Mayston (e.g., 1982), but his work was unfortunately
disregarded.
27 See Little (1952, section 2) and Bergson (1954, p. 237).
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been possible, Samuelson did not adapt his counterexample to the political context. Such
restraint is consistent with his long-standing view that Arrow's work is at least relevant
to "mathematical politics".28   
Persuasive as it is, Samuelson's example was not up the challenge posed by the single
profile impossibility theorem, since the crucial question for the welfare economists was
not to decide whether they should accept Single Profile Neutrality, but whether they
had accepted it, possibly without noticing. In order to compare this condition with the
welfare function W(U1(x),...,Un(x)), I represent the given profile of preference relations
in Single Profile Modified Domain by the set of all ordinal transforms
  ( 1 oU1,...,n oUn) of a given utility profile (U1,...,Un) , where the i  are increasing real
functions and the Ui  satisfy the relevant economic restrictions. Once this notational
step is performed, it turns out that there are three possibilities for W(U1(x),...,Un(x)),
each with distinctive consequences:
(1)   W(U1(x),...,Un(x)) = W( 1 o U1(x),...,n o Un(x)) for all possible 1,..., n. Here one
and the same W  is employed for the initial profile and all of its transforms. It can be
checked that on this construal, W  satisfies Single Profile Neutrality. Hence, from the
single profile theorem, it is dictatorial.
(2) Weaker invariance properties than (1), for example:
  W(U1(x),...,Un(x)) = W( 1 o U1(x),...,n o Un(x)) if 1 = ...= n,
or:
  W(U1(x),...,Un(x)) = W( 1 o U1(x),...,n o Un(x)) if there are a > 0 and b1,...,bn such
that i = au + bi  for all i.
Conceivably, there may be no invariance at all imposed on W . For this continuum of
cases,  Single Profile Neutrality never holds, and it is easy to exhibit examples fulfilling
the other conditions as well as Single Profile Non-Dictatorship. Standard examples are
the Rawlsian maximin, which satisfies the first restriction,29 and utilitarianism, which
satisfies the second.
(3)   W(U1(x),...,Un(x)) = W'( 1 oU1(x),...,n oUn(x)) for all sets of 1,..., n, with W'
being defined by this equation. In other words, there are not just one, but infinitely
many W  functions, one for each set of transforms, all of them delivering the same social
preference and even the same numerical values. This is an invariance statement again, but
widely different from those in (1) and (2). On this construal, the W  functions do not
                                    
28 Turning Samuelson against himself, Pollak (1979) argued that if Single Profile Neutrality is
objectionable in welfare economics, it may also be in relation to political or judicial rules. 
29 However, the maximin just satisfies Weak Pareto, not the full strength of the Pareto Principle.
17
satisfy Single-Profile Neutrality, and it is possible to find non-dictatorial examples to
meet the remaining conditions.
Among the three conceptions, only (2) involves interpersonal comparisons of utility.
The two examples in (2) correspond to familiar comparisons, i.e., those of utility levels
(for the maximin) and of utility differences (for utilitarianism). By contrast, (1) and (2)
deny interpersonal utility comparisons, but emphatically, in distinctive ways. Construal
(3) exactly formalizes Bergson's 1938 claim that the social welfare function depends on
indifference loci alone, which amounts to denying any interpersonal utility comparisons.
Construal (1) involves more than this denial. It also imposes welfarism in the following
heavy form. Not only are utility data sufficient to determine the social preference,
irrespective of the physical descriptions of the states, but the mapping from these
utility data to the social preference is fixed, whether utility data are computed with
(U1,...,Un)   or any authorized transform. Very roughly speaking, Single Profile
Neutrality may be decomposed into a denial of interpersonal utility comparisons and
another component, which I will refer to as strong welfarism. A crucial point, which
Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005) spell out formally, is that the full force of Single Profile
Neutrality, not only its denial of utility comparisons, is needed in order to derive
dictatorship. The latter does not follow from (3) alone.
The previous taxonomy explains why Samuelson and his opponents wrote at cross-
purposes throughout the controversy. The former interpreted the Bergson-Samuelson
function in the light of (3) exclusively, while the latter considered only (1) and (2).
Unfortunately, neither side was sophisticated enough to realize that the other was
conceiving of the W  function in a way different from its own. The taxonomy serves also
to clarify the various interpretations of W  that Bergson and Samuelson broached
simultaneously in their early work, and it helps locate Samuelson's intellectual change.
By contrast with the 1947 Foundations, his 1977 paper pursues only one interpretation
of W , which is (3).30 The paper improves on the treatise in another respect. At long
last, Samuelson offered a counterexample of a Bergson-Samuelson function that was not
dictatorial (1977, p. 84-86; see also 1981, p. 234). This function fits all the social choice
theorists' conditions except for Single Profile Neutrality, which is thus shown to be an
extraneous addition to the new welfare economics. The social choice theorists ignored
Samuelson's relevant reply probably because they were still concentrating on the other
suggestions contained in his previous work. Accordingly, even after Samuelson's
attempted clarification, they felt that the following dichotomy was compelling: either the
Bergson-Samuelson function is dictatorial (= (1)), or it makes interpersonal
                                    
30 Statement (3) formalizes the passage of the Foundations (1947, p. 228) quoted in section 4.
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comparisons of utility (= (2)). This has remained the received view of the controversy
and - by a further retrospective simplification - of the founding debate between Arrow
and Bergson.31
With Collective Choice and Social Welfare in 1970 and a series of related papers, Sen set
the stage for a new style of normative economics in which utility comparisons were the
focus of attention. Many eminent theorists followed in his footsteps. The most
common framework of analysis was welfarist in the strong sense.32 In such a
framework, the only way to avoid dictatorship is to allow for interpersonal comparisons
of utility functions. Accordingly, the older economists' question of whether such
comparisons should be made gave way to the more specialized one of finding which
were the appropriate ones, given varying normative commitments towards distribution.
This led to sophisticated comparisons between utility comparisons, and especially, to a
famous parallel between the Rawlsian-like leximin and utilitarian rules. Important as this
work was and still is, it proceeded from a premature rejection, and effectively a
misrepresentation, of the new welfare economists' contribution.  
5.3. Individualism and the tradition of the field
The last significant point made by the welfare economists, notably Little (1952) and
Bergson (1954), is that the functions E  or W  should not be interpreted as expressing
the society's ordering but only as an ordering relative to the society. But then, whose
ordering is it? Arrow's opponents insisted that it must be a person's. The welfare
economist, they claimed, is very much like a consultant. He counsels officials who are to
make large-scale decisions. He also counsels ordinary citizens who are willing to employ
him in order to decide, say, whether or not they will support a tax reform. Whichever is
the case, the argument continues, welfare analysis relates to somebody like you and me,
not to a nebulous collective entity. The individual client communicates his piecemeal
evaluative judgments to the welfare economist, who will summarize them into an
ordering. This conclusion is unproblematic because the usual rationality considerations
apply here to concrete individuals and are normatively compelling at this level.
This forceful answer would seem to cut the ground under Arrow's feet, and actually
preclude the development of social choice theory altogether. I am not aware of an
                                    
31 Parks (1976, p. 450) has a very clear statement of the dilemma, and it is reiterated in Kemp and Ng
(1977), Roberts (1980, p. 449), Sen (1986, p. 1149, with qualifications), Hammond (1991, p. 226).
However, the last writer takes a different stand in Fleurbaey and Hammond (2004).
32 See the work surveyed by d'Aspremont (1985), Sen (1986), Mongin and d'Aspremont (1998), Bossert
and Weymark (2004).
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explicit rebuttal in the literature, which makes it worthwhile to offer one here. One
version of the argument is easy to reject because it involves a serious confusion about
methodological individualism. The welfare economists claimed in effect that collective
entities ("the community as such", Bergson, 1954, p. 243) did not exist.  But it has been
argued, I think, convincingly that methodological individualism is not the thesis that
collectives do not exist. It is rather the (weaker) thesis that they cannot be automatically
endowed with well-defined aims or objectives. Methodological individualism is a way of
allocating the burden of proof. When it comes to, say, firms or nations, the burden of
proof is on whoever claims that there is such a thing as the firm's objective function, or
the nation's long-term interests. From this cursory discussion, I conclude that
methodological individualism supports, if anything at all, the programme of investigating
the conditions under which collective objectives can be constructed from individual
objectives as the relevant data. This, broadly speaking, is the programme of social choice
theory.
Here is a further counter-argument. Even granting the welfare economists' premiss that
the social welfare ordering is a person's ordering, there are difficulties for their position.
It amounts to discarding all of Arrow's conditions but one, i.e., Social Ordering. A priori,
the individual client may be of any ethical type. He might not even accept the Pareto
Principle, which would stop the analysis at the level of E  without W  being derivable.
But if this is the case, what rôle is left for welfare economists? They are reduced to the
menial task of teaching their clients how to maximize an objective function under
predetermined constraints, whatever this function and these constraints may be. Surely,
welfare economists have a higher opinion of their field. They write as if they have some
theory of what counts as a suitable social objective; in particular, they never seriously
envisage E  being other than Paretian. What leads them astray here may be the implicit
assumption that to form an ordering from a client's data is a trivial step. To be true to
the "economist as consultant" picture, they would have to take into account the
construction of the social welfare objective. It is at this prior stage that their traditional
commitments, such as the Pareto Principle, enter into the picture. But if the individual
client scenario is so enriched, social choice theory becomes relevant. Arrow's conditions,
or rather the corresponding single-profile conditions, become interesting prima facie.
They may be dismissed at the end of the day, but there is now some sense in saying that
they belong to theoretical welfare economics.33
                                    
33 Compare the argument of this paragraph with Arrow's discussion of individual distributional ethics
("the ethics of Primus") in his Collected Economic Papers, vol.1, ch.3, p. 55-56.
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The welfare economists' arguments relied not only on the two lines of argument which I
have disposed of, but also on invoking the tradition of their field. For instance, in the
same quoted passage, Bergson wrote: "I have thought here to make explicit that this
follows simply from the very nature of the discipline" (1954, p. 247). For all I know,
this remarkable declaration clashes with the history of the subject. Admittedly, the
notion of the economist as counselling individuals was commonplace in pre-war
economics. But I do not think that anybody at that time believed that the whole of
welfare economics could be reorganized around this single theme, especially when
counselling was construed as narrowly as it was in Bergson and Little.34 There is ample
evidence that: (a) in a number of cases, welfare economists did not have any counselling
scenario in mind; (b) when they did, they were prepared to extend their notion of a
client to the collective entity, whatever that meant for them;35 (c) they were not taking
social welfare orderings as given, but constructing them, at least coarsely or in outline.36
To summarize the point bluntly, the new welfare economics, in the Bergsonian-
Samuelsonian formulation of a social welfare function, was groping after something like
the social choice aggregation problem. Arrow puts it in this way: "Social choice theory
was a child, if unwanted, of the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function viewpoint."
(1983, p. 26). By denying the fact, welfare economists reformulated their enterprise in a
bizarre way, which could not enhance its prestige among general economists. This denial
provided them with a convenient excuse for not offering a complete analysis of Arrow's
impossibility theorem and ensuing work. Bergson's and Little's thinking about the
theorem never went beyond the disorganized stage of their initial reactions in the 1950's.
Not being hindered to the same extent by preconceptions about welfare economics,
Samuelson ended up offering the best analyses of the theorem and its single-profile
variant. Still, even his most sophisticated comments leave much to be desired, as
subsections 5.1 and 5.2 have shown.
 6. A word on the Compensation Principle
The Compensation Principle of the new welfare economics provides a link with social
choice theory that has attracted more attention than the Arrow-Bergson connection.
However, it is conceptually less significant than the latter for a reason that needs
spelling out. The critique of the Compensation Principle does not have to rely on using
                                    
34 Robbins (1932) might have. But he is not a welfare economist, and his positions were often rejected
by the new welfare economists for being too sktechy and too extreme.
35 Evidence for (b) can be found in Lange (1942), and even more clearly in the debate over the second
welfare theorem and the economic theory of socialism.
36 Clear evidence for (c) can be found even in Bergson (1938, p. 323).
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the impossibility theorem, unlike the critique of Bergsonian welfare economics, which
absolutely requires it.
As is well known, the compensation tests attempted to extend the range of welfare
judgments permitted by the Pareto Principle by taking into account the possibility of
the gainers' compensating the losers. The Kaldor-Hicks test was inconsistent in that it
led to cycles, actually obvious cycles of order two, but Scitovsky claimed that his more
sophisticated "double test" would remedy this defect. Arrow argued that the Scitovsky
test was also inconsistent. The logical skeleton of his refutation is this. The binary
relation implied by the Scitovsky test is incomplete; a natural way to make it complete
is to declare two states x and y indifferent with each other if the test is conclusive neither
for x against y, nor for y against x. However, indifference defined that way turns out to
be intransitive, as a three-alternative example demonstrates (1963, p. 45). This fairly
straightforward piece of reasoning stands by itself, regardless of the impossibility
theorem.
If Arrow had tried to base his refutation on the theorem, he would have said in essence
the following. Take any binary relation R that extends the partial ordering implied by the
Pareto Principle and makes it complete. If R results from a social welfare function, then
assuming the Arrovian conditions other than Social Ordering, one must conclude that R
is intransitive. This sounds like a powerful critique because, in contrast with the
previous argument, it does not depend on the particular way of making the Scitovsky
relation complete. It does not even depend on selecting the Scitovsky relation in the first
instance, and thus seems to provide an impressive refutation of the Compensation
Principle per se. However, the argument requires one to apply Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives to the Arrow function that formalizes the Compensation
Principle, and here we stumble on the same difficulties that have been spelled out for the
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. It is difficult to decide whether this
substantial objection crossed Arrow's mind when he decided to refute the Scitovsky test
by means of an example rather than the impossibility theorem. Rhetoric expediency
might have been the conscious reason: Scitovsky's simple idea called for an equally
simple rebuttal.
It is instructive to compare the two arguments envisaged here with Chipman and
Moore's (1978) detailed refutation. These authors establish that each test, including
Scitovsky's, is cyclical by constructing general equilibrium positions. Arrow's numerical
example and the suggested refutation through the impossibility theorem deliver the same
conclusion without attempting to satisfy this economically relevant constraint on the set
of social states. Chipman and Moore's argument is more telling, but it is also more
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remote from social choice theory. It is disappointing to conclude that the Compensation
Principle does not fit in with the present discussion of progress in normative economics.
7. Social choice theory and the conditions of progress
I return now to the abstract criterion of progress by relating it to the main case study. In
section 5, the word "problem" has come to mean two different things. I argued that the
general problem of aggregating individual utility functions was part of the conceptual
background of the new welfare economics, even if its spokesmen did not recognize it.
Besides, there was the specific problem created by the impossibility theorem, which was
of course invented by social choice theory, but must also count as a problem for the new
welfare economics, given that the general problem was in the air. I will discuss the
specific problem exclusively because the general problem is too vague to permit precise
comparisons with the four requirements.
Social choice theorists formulated the specific problem under the guise of a dichotomy -
either the Bergson-Samuelson function is dictatorial or it involves interpersonal
comparisons of utility - which made the choice of solution obvious. They said that
interpersonal comparisons of utility were unavoidable in general, and then proceeded to
prioritize some specific ways of making these comparisons. This would constitute
evidence of both a problem and a solution meeting requirement (1) if the dichotomy were
compelling. But section 5 has shown that this was not the case. Given the third
possibility that social choice theorists omitted - to reject the strong welfarism
component of Single Profile Neutrality, or, using Arrow's list, Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives -, their problem was inadequately formulated and their solution
was at best optional.
Despite this persuasive objection I will argue that (1) is fulfilled after all. My argument
depends on a crucial move - in order to describe the specific problem for T and its
solution in T', I propose to adopt not the perspective of T' at the time of the
controversy between T and T', but today's perspective on both theories, thus taking full
benefit of hindsight. We now understand Arrow's impossibility theorem and its single
profile variant much better than in the 1970s. The specific problem for the new welfare
economics has been shown to have a trilemma structure, and its solution accordingly to
involve two possibilities, i.e., to make interpersonal comparisons of either utility values
or of other individual data  (the latter is equivalent to rejecting strong welfarism).37 I
                                    
37 Samuelson's 1977 example of a well-behaved social welfare function illustrates the latter kind of
individual comparisons. He fixes a ray through the origin in the Euclidean space of commodity baskets,
and measures the individual utilities of x and y by the distances between the indifference curves of x
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will be able to conclude that requirement (1) is met if I manage to argue, first, that this
up-to-date formulation of the problem belongs to social choice theory, not welfare
economics or any other theory, and second, that the corresponding solution is
forthcoming in social choice theory, not elsewhere. The first point is easy to defend. To
restate the problem required one to isolate what, in the assumptions of the impossibility
theorem, went beyond the denial of interpersonal utility comparisons, given the other
background conditions, and it is social choice theory that permitted this analysis.
Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005) provide the desired decomposition of Single Profile
Neutrality by relating it to Sen's concept of the "social welfare functional", thus
employing the same formal tool as the social choice theorists they criticize. Those few
economists who carried out the same analysis also relied on social-choice-theoretic
tools.38 To draw an easy contrast, consider Samuelson again. Having never fully
mastered the Arrow-Sen concept of a functional linkage between individual
characteristics and social preferences, he was unable to generalize his 1977 counter-
example. Even his late papers in 1981 and 1987 remain at the level of imperfectly
analyzed particular cases. Also, he persistently misapprehended Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives by failing to connect it with Strong Neutrality. This stopped him
a long way from reaching a proper formulation of the specific problem.
The second point is not so easy to argue as the first. In retrospect, I have found only
one early piece in social choice theory that belongs to the unexplored line, i.e., Pazner
and Schmeidler's (1978) article on the "equivalent-egalitarian" criterion, which in effect
pursues Samuelson's unfinished 1977 analysis.39  This work borders on the fourth stage
of normative economics because of its implicit rejection of welfarism, and it is indeed the
fourth stage which brought out its potential clearly. Other attempts to elaborate on the
unexplored line are recent and quite clearly not limited to social choice theory.40  I
conclude that this theory is responsible for correctly stating the problem, but not the
whole of its solution. In order to dispose of this complication, I will modify my
tentative criterion of progress in the last section.
                                                                                                           
and y, respectively, to the origin. Kemp and Ng (1977) mistook Samuelson's procedure for a
comparison between cardinal utilities, a confusion that Mayston (1982) exposed without convincing
them.
38 Pazner (1979), Mayston (1982), Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1990), Fleurbaey and Maniquet
(in particular 1996 and 1999).
39 An allocation (x1,...,xn)  is egalitarian-equivalent if there is a benchmark vector x such that each
individual i  is indifferent between x and his component xi  in the allocation. When x  refers to the
total resources, Pareto-optimal egalitarian-equivalent allocations enter Samuelson's 1977 example as
special cases. This is shown in Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005, section 3).
40 Fleurbaey and Maniquet (see their 1999) have recently proposed solutions in the style of the
unexplored line. They are expressly intended to bridge the gap with public economics, and if only for
this reason, it would be implausible to locate them in social choice theory exclusively.
24
Both to support the argument that requirement (1) is met and to reach the same
conclusion for (2) and (3), I will pause and clarify the sense in which, generally
speaking, social choice theory can be said to resolve problems. Many in the field are
concerned mostly with exploring the compatibility or otherwise of given normative
assumptions, without taking sides strongly for or against them. They might point out
that an assumption is apparently acceptable or open to criticism, but would normally
refrain from entering a sustained normative debate. The problems they are interested in
take as their data some list of "axiomatic" conditions and their solutions take the form of
either an impossibility theorem (e.g., Arrow's five conditions are incompatible) or a
positive characterization (e.g., utilitarianism is characterized by such-and-such list).
With this formal interpretation of its task, social choice theory cannot regard the latter
class of results as being more important than the former. It is true that impossibility
theorems call for further investigations, while positive characterizations sound
definitive, but this very argument could be invoked to say that the former are deeper
than the latter. Now, beside this, currently predominant, formal notion of problem-
solving, there is another one, which makes the normative discussion a very substantial
part of the social choice theorist's activity. For a significant minority group - which I
would argue includes Arrow and Sen themselves - solutions should be given at the
substantial level of normative decisions made for or against a given set of conditions,
while the formal statements play the role of preliminary groundwork. With this more
commonsensical interpretation of its task, social choice theory will deemphasize
impossibility theorems; positive characterizations are what matters more.41 After
contrasting the two groups with each other, I hasten to add that they overlap massively
in their ordinary work. Some contributions are clearly purely formal, others are clearly
substantial or at least offered as such, but a good deal of the problem-solving activity in
the field falls in between.
This sketch needs comparing with what we know of the new welfare economists'
attitude towards normative commitments. They were wary of certain "value judgments"
and willing to indulge in others. They took the Pareto Principle to be both normatively
commendable and indispensable, and they regarded judgments of interpersonal
comparisons as being both normatively dubious and dispensable. These two substantial
commitments defined the range of acceptable problems for which solutions could be
sought. Within this substantially predetermined range, solutions were mostly offered at
the formal level, as is apparent in Bergson, Samuelson, Lange and their followers.
                                    
41 Mongin (2004) argues that the position of the second group is not only conceptually richer than that
of the first, but also to a large extent unavoidable, given the semantic contraints which go with the use of
normative predicates.
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Comparisons between the new welfare economics and social choice theory will not be
difficult to implement if one is careful to limit them to problem-solving activities of a
given type, either formal or substantial.
This warning puts into proper perspective both requirements (1) and (2). If one reads
Bergson and Samuelson's function as an entirely formal concept, the problem it raises
can be compared with the entirely formal solution "make interpersonal comparisons of
some kind". If (I think more appropriately) one interprets the function substantially, it
will have to include the denial of interpersonal utility comparisons, and the more
substantial solution becomes relevant: "make interpersonal comparisons of a non-utility
sort, e.g., of individual indifference curves". With this warning in mind, and possibly
taking into account the contribution of public economics, it is straightforward to check
that requirement (2) is fulfilled.
Similarly, both formal and substantial resolutions are appropriate when considering (3).
This requirement is easily satisfied by mentioning the problems in "mathematical
politics" that social choice theorists have both raised and solved, from the early revival
of the theory of committees in the 1950's to the current attempts to combine a
description of the political process with a market equilibrium analysis. These problems
were outside the initial range of the new welfare economics, and not only outside its
range as it was tactically redefined once Arrow's theorem became known. It is fair to
recall at this juncture that modern social choice theory results also from Black's Theory
of Committees and Elections (1958) and earlier work on the same topic. Alternatively,
one could stay even closer to Arrow's theorem and mention the variant proved by
Gibbard (1973), a justly famous result which opened up a whole new area of work - i.e.,
the nonmanipulability of social choice decisions.42
Given today's wide deployment of normative economics, it is not difficult to argue that
the asymmetry condition (4) is fulfilled. On the weak reading of this condition, it is
satisfied if the new welfare economics fails to solve an unresolved problem of either
social choice theory or public economics, or fails to solve some problems that these
theories do resolve, or fails to raise and eventually solve a problem of its own that these
theories are silent about. On the strong reading, all three failures would be required. The
weak reading seems to be preferable; if not, the criterion of progress would very rarely
                                    
42 A methodological dispute is likely to take place in connection with this and related examples. Some
writers in normative economics (e.g., Fleurbaey, 1996) believe that non-manipulability, and others
implementation concepts, belong to an area different from normative economics. As they construe it, the
latter is concerned solely with norms and evaluations, not with the way in which these can be achieved in
the economy. It seems that normative economics must be concerned with implementation issues, if only
because they count among the considerations weighing for or against evaluative criteria.  
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apply. However, in the present instance, the failure is multiple, and there is no need to
decide between the weak and strong reading.
8. The assumptions of welfare economics and the fourth stage of normative
economics
Although the main point has already been argued, i.e., that the third stage was a
progressive one, I would like to take a broader view of my topic and briefly reexamine
the basic assumptions of welfare economics. As will become apparent, the point is to
relate them to current work, i.e., the fourth stage of normative economics. This will lead
me further to clarify the sense in which the third stage was progressive.
Welfare economics relies on conceptually loaded assumptions that have become better
and better understood, and more and more heatedly criticized, with the passing of time.
The following list attempts to summarize them. I state them in terms of the ideal
concept of normative economics that welfare economics is supposed to encapsulate.
(I) Normative economics is an exclusively teleological theory. That is to say, it will
select a notion of the social good, and it will make all its evaluations and derived
prescriptions dependent on this chosen notion.
(II) The chosen notion of social good is social welfare. Social welfare is initially an
undefined term in normative economics. It will be explicated in terms of the next
conditions.
(III) Social welfare in any circumstances is entirely determined by the data of individual
welfare given these circumstances, and it increases when these data show an increase in
individual welfare. Normative economics makes this claim precise in terms of the Pareto
Principle, as interpreted in welfare terms.
(IV) Normative economics is not concerned with social states in general. Only economic
variables enter its description of the states.43 In effect, the economic variables to be
taken into account are the quantities of commodities consumed and of factors supplied
by the individuals. The commodities may be either private or public goods.
(V) Individual welfare can be measured by an index of preference satisfaction.
(VI) The index of preference satisfaction summarizes the individual's choice behaviour
("revealed preference theory").
(VII) The index can be endowed with the standard properties of an ordinal utility
function. Monotonicity or at least non-satiation is typically imposed, and sometimes
convexity as well. Other assumptions will have to be introduced to deal with risk and
                                    
43 This can be formally explicated by assuming that non-economic variables are separable from
economic variables within each individual welfare function. This is not a light assumption to make.
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uncertainty, and this is done again by borrowing standard microeconomic construals,
such as the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
(VIII) The index is not comparable from one individual to another.
This is a rough picture, but it is sufficient for the conceptual discussion.44 Welfare
economists generally do not distinguish (V) from (VI) because they take "revealed
preference theory" for granted. So, the statement corresponding to (V) and (VI) jointly
goes like this in welfare economics:
"A person's welfare map is defined to be identical with his preference map - which
indicates how he would choose between different situations, if he were given the
opportunity for choice. To say that his welfare would be higher in A than in B is thus
no more than to say that he would choose A rather than B, if he were allowed to make
the choice" (de Graaff, 1957, p. 5).45
All of these assumptions can be, and indeed have been, called into question, either
jointly or separately. Take (V) and (VI) together. Of course, welfare economists know
that maximizing behaviour in the revealed preference sense does not have the same
meaning as maximizing behaviour in the welfare sense. What they intend to say is only
that the former can serve as a measure of the other for the purpose of the theory.
Presumably, this is the reason why de Graaff employs the word "defined" in the
previous quote. Then, domain considerations should come to the forefront. The (purely
extensional) coincidence of the two kinds of behaviour can only be justified by appealing
to the restrictive notion of social states in welfare economics. This means that we should
really consider (V) and (VI) jointly with (IV). But even in this charitable reading, the
claim is more than dubious. Suppose that I have to choose between various baskets of
apples and bananas, a matter relevant to the "economic" notion of a social state. From
the fact that x is my chosen basket, and y is not, the welfare economist still cannot infer
that my welfare would be lower in y than it is in x. This is a non-sequitur. They may be
all sorts of reasons why I choose x instead of y, not all of them have to do with my
welfare. Quite trivially, my tastes for apples and bananas might induce me to choose a
basket with, say, too many bananas for my welfare. Some will perhaps be tempted to
reply that non-welfare reasons show up as violations of the consistency of choices, but
this would be a gratuitous assumption to make. A more standard reply is this. One
cannot say that I am choosing too many bananas for my welfare if I really choose to
                                    
44 It has sometimes been said that welfare economics needed only to make assumptions about variations
in individual and social welfare; see Little (1950). I discard this line of analysis partly for simplicity,
partly because it does not seem very plausible to investigate variations in a quantity without saying what
the quantity refers to.
45 Compare with related statements in Boadway and Bruce (1984, p. 8), Little (1950), Mishan (1969, p.
23-25).
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have this basket. But this is tantamount to saying that, after all, welfare is the same
thing as choice - a claim that was discarded at the outset as implausible. Notice that the
familiar contention, "people are the best judges of their own interest", is not sufficient to
warrant the conclusion that choices provide a measure of welfare. The claim may be true
without the people's good judgment surfacing in their choices.
One way or another, the arguments just sketched have been made several times.46 What
I want to stress in connection with the present analysis of progress is that this
seemingly commonsensical critique has entered normative economics only recently. It is
not well taken by social choice theory, which generally has little to contribute to the
interpretation of the preference concept. For most social choice theorists, preferences
are just preferences, whatever that means; and if they are pressed to provide an
interpretation, they might very well follow the welfare economist into the trap of
"defining" welfare by choice.47 It is only in the work currently pursued about
nonstandard indexes of welfare, especially in connection with Sen's (1985)
"functionings" and "capabilities", that the critique above has become broadly
understood.
A different (and more sophisticated) critique of welfare economics results from focusing
on (IV) and (V), while putting (VI) aside. To relate an economic notion of welfare to any
concept of preference raises possible objections. Sen's (e.g., 1979, 1985) arguments
usually proceed by considering actual preferences - "tastes" in Arrow's terminology.
But it is possible to introduce a notion of improved preferences that is located
somewhere between "tastes" and "values", i.e., preferences for the individual's own
good.48
These issues are often discussed in connection with the already mentioned concept of
welfarism. In Sen and others, it refers to the view that individual utility data are both
necessary and sufficient to form an index of social welfare. This is also the definition
employed thus far this paper. It has the defect of trading on an unspecified notion of
"utility", and in the present context of conceptual discussion, it seems preferable to fix a
more substantial conception of welfarism, as claiming that individual welfare data are
both necessary and sufficient to form an index of social welfare. Then, welfarism
becomes identical with assumption (III) in the list. The argument against sufficiency can
                                    
46 Some were already made by the philosophers (not the economists!) participating in the conference
Human Values and Economic Policy (1967). Further occurrences are, among others, Broome (1978), Sen
(1985), Mongin and d'Aspremont (1998).
47 This happened several times over at recent meetings of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare.
48 This sense of preference is suggested by the important work of Griffin (1986) and Harsanyi (1977).
Mongin and d'Aspremont (1998, p. 388-401) follow the same direction.
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be made in terms of socially undesirable aspirations, as in Hare's (1976) fanatic example
or in Sen's (1970) Paretian Liberal paradox. The case against necessity is not so
straightforward to argue, and might necessitate considering the pitfalls of the Pareto
Principle in the uncertainty context, which would involve assumption (VII) in the
discussion.49 I skip the discussion of the more basic commitments (I) and (II), which
Sen and his followers have also come to question. Roughly speaking, it involves either
changing (II) to enlarge the notion of social good beyond that of social welfare,50 or
replacing in (I) "to form a notion of the social objective" by "to evaluate social states",
so as to make room for deontological considerations.51
This bird-eye review was meant to support two methodological claims. First, as already
emphasized, it was only long after the early stages of social choice theory that the
argument against the new welfare economics was properly sorted out. I mentioned
Arrow's occasional anticipation of a far-reaching critique of the new welfare economics,
i.e., a critique which would hit not only the Bergsonian Economic Welfare Function, but
the Paretian core of welfare economics. Whatever Arrow's intentions were in 1951 and
in 1963, I do not think that he had the conceptual means of pursuing such a critique. The
current discussions help to formulate it more appropriately. Second, there is a claim that
is in a sense reciprocal to the previous one. The current discussions are usefully
reorganized within the framework of a step-by-step refutation of the new welfare
economics – even though the latter is old hat for many of today's readers. Precisely
because they embody an intermediary stage of critical thinking, the Arrovian and post-
Arrovian theories of the 1950-1980s are not a good polemical target to choose for "post-
welfarist" writers. It is better to shoot at a theory which is blunter about its conceptual
commitments.  
This brief excursion into the fourth stage illustrates a relevant generality about the pace
of progress in normative economics. Not only has this pace proved to be painfully slow,
but  it appears to follow a lag pattern. The most important semantic findings about the
second stage are becoming available only now that normative economics has entered its
fourth stage.  In a rough parallel, section 7 has argued that the logical problem
surrounding the Bergson-Samuelson function has been sorted out only recently, and that
the fourth stage perspective inspired some of its solutions. Progress in normative
economics can be appreciated only by comparing non-successive theories. Such lags are
perhaps not surprising given the problem-based criterion adopted for assessing progress.
                                    
49 On this line of objection see, e.g., Mongin and d'Aspremont (1998).
50 Presumably, the work on "capabilities" follows this line of teleological, non-welfarist thinking.
51 As in the work on rights stemming from another part of Sen's work (e.g., 1981).
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Indeed, problems have a life of their own, some of them being quickly clarified, others
dragging on for years.
9. Conclusions and qualifications
By way of conclusion, I return to the tentative definition of progress, and discuss
qualifications and refinements of the four requirements. To echo the last comment, I
propose to reformulate (1) as follows: T' points out a problem that is unresolved in T,
and this problem is resolved by T' either alone or in collaboration with some T''
succeeding T'.  This generalization seems to be unproblematic, given that the criterion
aims only at making the commonsense notion of progress more precise, and it is
intuitive that a theory is progressive with respect to another, not only if it contains the
full clarification and resolution of a problem raised by the latter, but also if it prepares
this final stage decisively. It would be interesting to collect scientific cases of the lagged
manifestations of progress, but the growth-of-knowledge literature seems to have
neglected the possibility that normative economics illustrates.     
I have already said that the unresolved problem in (1) may be like an anomaly for T or
like a novel fact pointed out by T'. Boldly generalizing on the irrelevance of
Compensation Tests for the present inquiry, I tend to believe that cases of the first kind
will be scarcer than those of the second kind in normative disciplines. This means that
the assessment in these disciplines will always be controversial, since one must expect
the T theorists to deny what the T' theorists claim, i.e., that there is a problem for T.
The standard philosophy-of-science suggestion to decide between the two camps would
be to resort to an external decision procedure, and the latter would go roughly like this.
Investigate the formal languages of T and T', as well as the intended interpretations of
sentences produced by T and T' using their respective languages. If the problem made
explicit by T' with its own syntactical and semantic resources could also have been
formulated in the language of T, and if once so formulated, this problem would have
fallen within the range of interpretations intended by T, then you may conclude that it
was a theoretical problem for T; otherwise, the problem belongs to T' exclusively. To
some extent this abstract description fits the case study. At least, this is how I started
discussing Arrow's conditions and whether they apply to the new welfare economics.
However, once confronted with a crucial, but syntactically and semantically equivocal
expression, "the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function", I had to enter the
economists' "conversations", as the fashionable slogan goes. Samuelson ended up
restricting the initial sense of his welfare function, and one may wonder whether this
shift was not in part the result of the social choice theorists' intervening work, in the
same way as Bergson and Little altered the scope of welfare economics in reaction to
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Arrow's criticisms. This is a case where the semantics and even the syntax of T are
adjusted after the fact to those of T', and it prevents the procedure from delivering any
relevant information, since the T theorists blur comparisons with T'. I would expect
such disturbing phenomena to take place often in normative disciplines. The only way
to disentangle them is to subject the external decision procedure to a pragmatic and
rhetoric analysis, as I did sketchily here and more thoroughly in Fleurbaey and Mongin
(2005).
This said, my approach is not pragmatic or rhetoric from the start contrary to
McCloskey's (1994) approach or Dascal's (1998) more recent alternative.52 Rather, it
complements the syntactical and semantic analysis when they prove to be dubious or
inconclusive. How this works can be illustrated by the above discussion of Arrow's
unfinished attack against Bergson. Arrow had full control over the syntactical and
semantic parts of his argument, but he chose to argue directly for Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives instead of trying to show that this condition was somehow
needed by his opponent's position. A pragmatic (communication) disaster followed
from this initial rhetoric move: for a long time, social choice theorists believed the
condition to be unproblematic when they compared Arrow and Bergson. Here,
pragmatic and rhetoric considerations come to the rescue of syntax and semantics, which
would not provide the full picture.
I move on to requirement (2), which I propose to qualify in the same way as I did (1): T'
or subsequent theories  T'' provide solutions to the main problems that T had already
addressed and resolved in its own way. There is a persisting difficulty with the
condition that T' or T'' solve the main problems of T, instead of all the problems of T. I
said that the standard requirement is too strong to make the methodology of research
programmes really applicable, but I must concede that my weakening is not only vague
but even possibly inconsistent. It is conceivable that T' solve the main problems of T,
while T'' solve the main problems of T', but not those of T. In this case, the "more
progressive than" relation would be intransitive, which sounds absurd. Thus far, I have
found no way out of this unpleasant dilemma.
Here is another less apparent difficulty for (2). The requirement that T' or T'' continue
to solve the main problems of T is strong enough to ensure continuity, but not to
exclude that dubious resolutions will be perpetuated. In the empirical sciences the
corresponding requisite - roughly, that T' recovers most of the corroborated content of
                                    
52 Dascal (1998) has recently proposed a method of studying scientific controversies and he has already
illustrated it in economics in Dascal and Cremaschi (1999).
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T - ensures in principle that what is common to T and T' is also what is valuable. Of
course, the contrast must not be overdone: corroboration is arguably never definitive,
and some problem resolutions can be. But there remains a substantial dissimilarity, and
it might indicate that only progress "in the small", not progress "in the large" as in grand
science, is really feasible for normative disciplines. Given the conceptual difficulties - or
rather, the mass of confusions - which social choice theory unconsciously borrowed
from the new welfare economics, the progress from one to the other is more limited than
even my already qualified account suggests.
Concerning (3), I will only mention that this condition does not insist on originality, at
least in the following sense. It is sufficient if traditional conceptions are brought by T' to
bear on the given problem.  The way in which public economics has repeatedly dragged
the time-honoured rule of utilitarianism into welfare discussions is a case to the point.
There is an analogy between the claim made here about originality and a view that
surfaced in earlier philosophy-of-science discussions of novel facts. Against Lakatos's
"temporal" view of evidence, it was argued - successfully, I believe - that a new theory
could be corroborated by evidence already known before that theory came into
existence.53
Requirement (4) was said to be easily met, a feature which makes the present study
perhaps unrepresentative of economics generally. Outside normative economics proper,
the field abounds in cases in which the first three conditions would apply more or less
plausibly, but the fourth one would not be met. Consider the recent "non-expected"
utility theories of risky choice. They solve a number of problems - some of them
empirical, others normative -  that were left open in von Neumann-Morgenstern theory.
However, the smooth analysis of risk-attitudes provided by the latter has not found a
full counterpart in the former. There are simple questions relative to insurance coverage
or portfolio diversification that they cannot answer well. Perhaps they will do so in due
course, but given their current state, one could argue that they are progressive only by
adopting the weak (disjunctive) interpretation of (4).54
There is a warning I should finally make, lest the contribution of this paper be
misunderstood. Welfare economics died, or rather disintegrated progressively, for many
different reasons, not all of which are connected with the emergence of a progressive
alternative theory.  The pre-war controversy on market socialism could not be resolved
by means of the fundamental welfare theorems, nor more generally in terms of the
                                    
53 See Zahar (1983) and Worrall (1985).
54 The putative example of progress constituted by nonexpected utility theories was discussed by
Mongin (1988) along Lakatosian lines; it has been usefully re-examined by Guala (2000). 
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existing welfare economics; this was perhaps the first serious warning about its
limitations. The post-war years witnessed an increasing discontent with its policy
conclusions, not only because of the pervasiveness of externalities, but also because
"second-best" considerations rose to the forefront. So the achievements of the new
welfare economics proved dubious even to those who were not impressed by Arrow and
his new style of theorizing. This suggests that one should be clear about the following
distinction. There is a difference between claiming that the four conditions apply with
some dose of success to the historical development of normative economics, and
claiming that these conditions state the causal factors accounting for this development.
The rational reconstruction of normative economics I have attempted is itself evaluative,
and does not by itself purport to make causality claims. But it suggests links that could
possibly be turned into causality claims, and it is left for the historian to decide on that
remaining issue.
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